4 Rousseau, the same cannot be said of the connections between Smith and Mandeville. This article seeks to redress the balance. In particular, I focus on Mandeville's historicized account of the development of human sociability and government to reveal its affinities with Rousseau's better-known arguments.
Mandeville's account challenges anyone who thinks that humans are naturally sociable creatures or who seeks to defend the moral character of commercial society-a challenge reinforced by, but not original to, Rousseau's Discourse. I argue that while Smith set out important aspects of his moral philosophy against Mandeville, his own account of both the origins and inner workings of commercial society relies on a more Mandevillean analysis than he ever acknowledged. 7 In short, Smith's attempt to distance his defense of commercial society from the Mandeville-Rousseau position was a partial, but not complete, success.
Although this article addresses a question principally of interest to Smith scholars, it brings a historical perspective to bear on questions about the morality of commercial society that continue to divide critics and proponents of capitalism. Indeed, some contemporary critics still regard Smith identifies four substantive points of agreement between Mandeville and Rousseau. He also notes some important points where the two diverge, but identifying the points of agreement seems to have been his overriding concern. He sometimes even accentuates these in order to downplay the differences, as the first point of comparison illustrates. Despite Mandeville having presented the primitive state of mankind as the most wretched, and Rousseau having presented it as the happiest, they both argue that humans have no natural instinct to seek society for its own sake. Throughout both volumes of the Fable, Mandeville consistently denied that humans naturally seek society for its own sake. His most nuanced defense of this denial, however, is developed in the final dialogues of volume two, published in 1728, where, for the first time, he examines the historical causes of human sociability in detail (FB II, . This is much the same approach to the question of human sociability as Rousseau takes in the Discourse, so focusing on the second volume of the Fable is key when assessing the extent to which their views on sociability converge.
The allusion to the historicity of volume two of the Fable is stronger in the second point of agreement Smith identifies. While noting that Mandeville and Rousseau provide different reasons for why humans would have left their primitive state, Smith suggests that these differences amount to little, since they end up telling a very similar story about the slow progress in the arts, talents and habits that enabled humans to live together in society. The gradual, developmental account of society was one of the most important additions to Mandeville's later theory. Indeed, in volume two of the Fable, he arguably presents a "conjectural history" of sociability and government-a term that, retrospectively, was used to describe Smith's own approach, 20 but which equally applies to Mandeville and Rousseau.
To understand the origins of political society, Mandeville explains, "I go directly to the Fountain Head, Governments," based on "hypothetical and conditional reasonings" (DOI, 16, 19, 42 suggests that attending to his own historical analysis of the origins of society and government might help to reveal how he addressed the problems Mandeville and Rousseau were grappling with.
The third point of agreement is that Mandeville and Rousseau both think that the laws of justice were the invention of the cunning and powerful to consolidate their superiority over the poor. The fourth and final point of agreement concerns pity. Smith notes that Rousseau explicitly criticized Mandeville for failing to realize that pity is the source of many of the social virtues whose reality the Fable denies. This point does not refer to the second volume. Smith is pointing to the only explicit discussion of Mandeville in the Discourse, where Rousseau's analysis is based on "An Essay on Charity, and Charity-Schools" from the (second edition of the) first volume of the Fable (DOI, 36-37; cf. FB I, 254-256). It has recently been suggested that Smith is praising Rousseau here for having advanced beyond Mandeville. 22 Once again, however, he appears more concerned with the underlying affinity between their positions, as they both maintain that pity is more prominent amongst savages and the vulgar than it is amongst civilized peoples. Even for Rousseau, Smith thinks, the principle of pity is not itself a virtue. While Smith would similarly argue that pity may even be found amongst criminals and "is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane" (TMS, I.i.1.1), he also sought to refute the idea (as I show later) that sociable sentiments are more prevalent amongst savages than civilized peoples.
From the foregoing analysis it should be clear that when Smith identified volume two of Mandeville's Fable as the inspiration for Rousseau's Discourse, he most probably had in mind their conjectural histories of society and government. To see why this matters for understanding his engagement with both thinkers it is necessary to elucidate Mandeville's conjectural history in more detail and show how, channeled through Rousseau, it challenges the moral character of modern society.
Mandeville's Challenge, Channeled through Rousseau
In "A Search into the Nature of Society," Mandeville proclaimed that "it is impossible we could be given rise to ever-increasing desires, but it is only amongst civilized people that the "Love Man has for his Ease and Security, and his perpetual Desire for meliorating his Condition, must be sufficient Motives 14 to make him fond of society" (FB II, (180) (181) . This fondness for society is the effect, rather than the cause, of humans associating together.
Mandeville thinks that the second idea of human sociability has more going for it. We strive for our own happiness and over time we chance upon discoveries that eventually lead to the establishment of political societies. Somewhat paradoxically, we become sociable "only by living together in society." Humans are designed for society in much the same way that grapes are for wine;
it is only by being carefully squeezed together under the right conditions that sociability emerges (FB II, 185, 188-189). Mandeville's overriding point, then, is that it is only as humans experience the benefits of social interaction that they start to become sociable themselves.
This account of human sociability provides the basis for the conjectural history of government in the final two dialogues. Mandeville again stresses that it would have taken many generations "and the Concurrence of many favourable Accidents" for societies to have formed from private families (FB II, 200). To explain the origins of government it is first necessary to identify the principle in human nature that would drive some people to govern others. This principle is the "Desire of Dominion," or desire for superiority, which is a consequence of our pride (FB II, (204) (205) . Having identified this principle, the stages by which humans moved from families to society could be traced.
The first motive leading savages to associate together would be the danger posed by wild beasts (FB II, (230) (231) (232) (238) (239) (240) (241) (242) . As families started living together in small societies, however, the greatest threat would soon become the pride and ambition of other people, leading to contention. Mandeville depicted this state of human development as miserable. People would not keep contracts longer than their interest in doing so lasted, and "their unruly Passions, and the Discords occasioned by them, would never suffer them to be happy." It is the domineering passions based on pride and self-liking that make this state miserable, but, over a few generations, leaders would emerge who are able to find ways of curbing the passions of others through penalties and prohibitions, thereby making themselves obeyed (FB II, (266) (267) (268) To explain the invention of letters, however, a more fundamental problem had to be addressed concerning the origins of speech or language, which Mandeville returned to later in the sixth dialogue.
This problem was central to many eighteenth-century debates about the history of sociability and civilization, especially for Rousseau and Smith, and is important for assessing the extent to which Smith distanced himself from Mandeville. 24 In their most primitive condition, Mandeville argues, savages would have had no language and speech would have developed gradually over time. The original motive for speech would not have been the desire to make oneself understood, but, instead, the desire to persuade others. This persuasion could take the form of seeking praise for our actions and attributes, or of making others submit to our desires (FB II, 289). Either way, it is self-liking and the desire for dominion that explain the origins of speech; the "natural Ambition and strong Desire Men have to triumph over, as well as persuade others, are the occasion of all this" (FB II, 291).
Once speech is perfected and humans are governed by written laws, great progress could finally be made: property and safety may be secured, the division of labor occurs and industry increases, with the "Love of Peace" spreading as the benefits of civilized society become widely recognized (FB II, (283) (284) . It is only once regular laws are established and observed that "Multitudes may be kept in tolerable Concord among themselves," which is impossible until human understanding has advanced well beyond the state of savages (FB II, 300). Mandeville's conjectural history of government, then, focuses on showing how self-liking, or pride, and the consequent desire for dominion, play out in different stages of the move from savage to civilized society. He stresses that the more civilized we become the more injurious we find it to have our true nature seen (FB II, 303) . We are at greater pains to ensure that others think highly of us, and we thus put on a façade to conceal our natural sentiments and appear sociable to others. principle from self-love (amour de soi-même), he also distances this principle from sociability (DOI, 15). Pity is a natural aversion to witnessing the suffering of others, but, as Smith recognized, this is still some way short of a desire to seek society for its own sake. For Rousseau, it would have taken a great deal of time and chance circumstances for humans to be drawn together in societies. Like Mandeville, he recognizes that part of the problem here involves explaining the origins of language, and although he does not offer a solution to the problem in the Discourse, he presents the problem in such a way as to reinforce the difficulties with maintaining that humans are naturally sociable (DOI, 33-34).
The most important differences between Mandeville's and Rousseau's conjectural histories concern the earliest stages of human development. Rousseau ridicules the idea that savages would have been driven to unite through fear of wild beasts (DOI, 22), and it takes him much longer to arrive at the point where the desire to be esteemed by others leads to contention. 18 the other; and always the hidden desire to profit at the expense of others. All these evils are the first effect of property and the inseparable consequence of nascent inequality (DOI, 51-52).
Smith translated this passage at length, as he did Rousseau's later comparison between the savage who "lives within himself" and the "sociable man" who lives "only in the opinion of others," for whom everything "is reduced to appearances, everything becomes artificial and deceptive" (DOI, 66; ER, 252-253). Rousseau agreed with Mandeville that what passes for sociability in modern societies is based on deceit and hypocrisy, but he went much further in stressing that the extent of artifice and dissimulation is accentuated by increased commercial activity under conditions of inequality. Modern society places us in competition with one another, yet we still have to appeal to the interest and opinion of others to survive; we compete for reputation and the esteem of others as much as we do for material goods. It is precisely the gulf that opens up between how we really are and how we must appear to others that makes civilized life so miserable on Rousseau's account.
In charting the rise of amour-propre in the development of modern society, Rousseau channeled Mandeville's ideas about how self-liking leads us to put on a mask of sociability. Where for Mandeville self-liking and the desire for dominion characterize our social condition, for Rousseau (to quote again from a passage Smith translated), it is only once "the words power and reputation" come to mean something that human misery ensues (DOI, 66; ER, 253) . In each case, modern society is characterized by our living in the opinion of others and putting on whatever sort of façade is necessary to acquire the reputation we desire. This is the challenge to which anyone who sought to defend the moral character of commercial society would have to respond. Smith took the challenge seriously.
Smith's Response to the Mandevillean Challenge
The "Letter to the Edinburgh Review" indicates that Smith recognized the extent to which Rousseau's critique of modern society was based on Mandeville's principles. Indeed, it is plausible to think that the publication of the Discourse on Inequality alerted Smith to the fact that the most troubling ethical , and, in light of the "Letter," the distinction could be taken as a way of answering Rousseau too. 32 Mandeville had been right to stress the extent to which we desire the esteem and approbation of others (TMS, VII.ii.4.10-11), but wrong to think that that we desire this irrespective of whether we merit such approbation.
While Mandeville never used the phrase love of praiseworthiness, he did consider the possibility that we are motivated by such a desire: "if Reason in Man was of equal weight with his Pride, he could never be pleas'd with Praises, which he is conscious he don't deserve" (FB I, 63). But pride is far more powerful than reason. The desire for unmerited praise, and aversion to being justly blamed, is often to be observed, especially amongst children who have not yet learned to hide their passions in such a way as to make them appear more sociable than they really are. 33 Even if Smith was right to identify the love of praiseworthiness as an independent principle from the love of praise,
Mandeville could still counter that the former fails to explain much about human behavior in modern society. To put the point another way, even if it is granted that we are naturally sympathetic creatures who desire to be praiseworthy, more needs to be said to distance Smith's analysis of commercial society from Mandeville's and Rousseau's: it needs to be shown that these genuinely sociable sentiments are at play in such societies. Smith also took up this challenge, with mixed success. Rousseau's views on these issues, and had gestured towards them explicitly in the "Letter."
Mandeville's and Rousseau's accounts of the difference between savage and civilized life. Mandeville and Rousseau both granted the existence of pity, which is the closest thing in their theories to a naturally sociable sentiment. Yet, as Smith noted in the "Letter," they both claimed that this sentiment is strongest amongst savages and weakens with the development of society. At a number of points in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, however, Smith maintains that sociable sentiments are more prevalent in civilized societies than savage ones.
Smith thought that the security and affluence characteristic of civilized nations allows for the virtues "founded upon humanity" (humanity being a "social" passion) to be cultivated more than the virtues "founded upon self-denial and the command of the passions." In savage nations, where all struggle to secure their own subsistence, the opposite is true: savages lack sympathy with one another and interact more as strangers than as friends. It is only once people become more comfortable in securing the necessities of life that they are able to express their emotions more freely and develop greater sensibility towards the sentiments of others. Crucially, for Smith-in stark contrast to
Mandeville and Rousseau-it is savages who most often have to conceal their passions from others and thus acquire "habits of falsehood and dissimulation," whereas civilized people are more open and sincere (TMS, V.2.8-13). It is not just inherently sociable sentiments that Smith thinks are more cultivated in civilized societies, but also the sentiments of justice (TMS, VII.iv.36) and those associated with prudence, such as probity and punctuality, which are almost unknown in barbarous nations and develop only with the introduction of commerce (LJ, 528, (538) (539) . While justice and prudence are not inherently sociable sentiments, their prominence does help to deflect the charge that commercial society is characterized by deceit. The "prudent man," Smith claims, while "not always much disposed to general sociality," nevertheless steers clear of "the cunning devices of an artful imposter" and "is always sincere" (TMS, VI.i.7-9).
35
Where Mandeville and Rousseau saw deceit and hypocrisy as central to an analysis of commercial society, Smith thought that these vices were less to be found in commercial societies than 35 Similarly, the virtue of justice is based on sympathizing with the victim's resentment, but resentment itself is an "unsocial passion" (TMS, I.ii.3.1-8; II.ii.1-3).
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in savage or barbarian ones. In this respect he clearly distanced himself from the Mandevillean analysis, but other tensions remain when assessing the moral character of commercial society. Perhaps the most famous of these concerns Smith's worries about the effects of the division of labor, which, amongst its many degrading tendencies, renders the laboring poor incapable "of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment," and threatens to extinguish "all the nobler parts of the human character" (WN, V.i.f.50-51; see also LJ, 539-541). Here, however, I focus on a different tension that has received far less scrutiny, but which comes into sharper view in light of Mandeville's conjectural history from volume two of the Fable. That is, while Smith in many places avowed that sociable sentiments are more prevalent in commercial societies than in savage or barbarian ones, when explaining both the historical emergence and inner workings of commercial society he falls back on a much more Mandevillean position, where such sentiments seem to be doing very little explanatory work. A passage towards the end of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is particularly instructive:
The desire of being believed, the desire of persuading, of leading and directing other people, seems to be one of the strongest of all our natural desires. It is, perhaps, the instinct upon which is founded the faculty of speech, the characteristic faculty of human nature.
… Great ambition, the desire of real superiority, of leading and directing, seems to be altogether peculiar to man, and speech is that great instrument of ambition, of real superiority, of leading and directing the judgments and conduct of other people (TMS, VII.iv.25).
Smith speculates that the origins of language might be explained in terms of the desire to persuade others. While Mandeville is not mentioned explicitly here, the passage captures a great deal of his view on the relation between language, persuasion and self-liking from volume two of the Fable: not only is speech about persuading others, the reason why we seek to persuade others is that we desire superiority over them. 36 This point is crucial when examining the extent to which Smith distanced his analysis from
Mandeville, but it has rarely received any scholarly attention. 37 It has at least two important implications.
First, the natural desire we have to persuade others is the principle from which the propensity to truck, barter and exchange derives. This propensity, in turn, gives rise to the arts, commerce and division of labor, which eventually lead to the great opulence and wealth of modern commercial societies (LJ 352, (493) (494) 527; WN, . In short, the propensity to barter-derived from the desire to persuade others-does much of the explanatory work in Smith's history of modern society. There is, however, nothing inherently sociable about this all-important desire in explaining the eventual development of commerce; "it is not marked with anything amiable" (LJ, 527), but, as Mandeville stressed, is bound up with self-liking and superiority. It is worth remembering this when Smith writes that a commercial society is one in which everyone "becomes in some measure a merchant" (WN, I.iv.1). It is far from evident that there is anything genuinely sociable about the interactions that characterize such societies; after all, society subsists amongst merchants "from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love of affection" (TMS, II.ii.3.2). The social bonds that characterize commercial society, then, are in fact more akin to the second of the two ideas of sociability Mandeville canvassed than the first: humans are sociable in the sense that they come to recognize the benefits of associating together, not because they are naturally fond of society.
38
Second, the desire of persuading others is closely related to ambition, which has an important role in Smith's theory. The distinction of ranks that preserves peace and order in society is based on ambition, which, despite being a selfish passion, is nonetheless admirable when kept within the bounds of prudence and justice (TMS, III.6.6-7). Yet the admiration accorded to the higher ranks in society those we seek to persuade and shows them respect. Fleischacker is right to argue that persuasion has more favorable connotations than force, but he downplays its association with the desire for superiority.
37 A notable exception is Kerkhof, "A fatal attraction?" 232-233, but he does not discuss this point in any detail.
38 This is not to deny that Smith thinks that humans naturally desire the company of others and take pleasure in mutual sympathy. My claim, more specifically, is simply that this desire does not characterize the social bonds associated distinctively with commercial society.
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might be viewed as a problem for reasons similar to those Mandeville and Rousseau diagnosed. In the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), Smith adds a chapter on the corruption of our moral sentiments-directly following the chapter on ambition and the distinction of ranks-which has been taken as evidence that he was still concerned with the challenge posed by Mandeville and
Rousseau right down to the end of his life. 39 The way Smith deals with the worry about corruption helps to illustrate both the extent and limitations of his attempt to distance himself from Mandeville's principles.
"The great mob of mankind," Smith recognizes, admire power and riches more than virtue and wisdom, and this threatens to corrupt our moral sentiments. While virtue and wisdom are praiseworthy, power and riches are far more reliable objects of praise, irrespective of their merit. This creates a problem because "we desire both to be respectable and to be respected"-or to be both praised and Smith, of course, did justify commercial society on instrumental grounds, most notably in his famous invisible hand passage, which is often read as part of his response to Rousseau. 42 There he makes the very Mandevillean point that the poor benefit from the "luxury and caprice" of the rich despite the selfishness of the latter (TMS, IV.1.10). This instrumental point is probably Smith's most celebrated justification of commercial society, but it is only one element in a wide-ranging defense. In 
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First, for Mandeville, Rousseau and Smith, the question whether commercial society is intrinsically unattractive largely turned on whether it results in us becoming more hypocritical and deceitful than we would otherwise be (in non-commercial societies), or whether it promotes openness and sincerity. On this question, Smith's position was in stark opposition to Mandeville's and Rousseau's. Second, Smith thought that commercial society was characterized by the virtues of prudence and justice, rather than the repugnant motives of fear and greed. Indeed, while self-love is central to Smith's analysis of commercial society, he maintained that amongst most people it manifests itself in the virtue of prudence far more than the vice of greed, or avarice. This is not to suggest that
Smith's analysis should be taken as the last word on the subject, but the questions that separated him from Mandeville and Rousseau are still worth asking if we are concerned with the morality of capitalism. Returning to these debates, then, is one way to broaden our perspective on the questions we should be asking, which is not to say that our answers should be the same. But if the principles of Mandeville, channeled through Rousseau, still present one of the greatest challenges to those who defend the moral character of commercial society, then Smith still provides one of the most thoughtful answers to that challenge, precisely because he took it so seriously.
